

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18 : CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2

Dissemination Control Markings

NOFORN

Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals

ORCON

Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled

by Originator

NFIBONLY

NFIB Departments, Agencies,

and Components Only

NOCONTRACT

Not Releasable to Contractors

or Contractor/Consultants

PROPIN

Caution-Proprietary Information Involved

WNINTEL

Warning Notice-Intelligence

Sources and Methods

involved

REL ...

This information has been Authorized for

Release to . . .

North Korean Exercise Activity: Before and Since 1980 (U)

25X1

Information Cutoff Date: 12 September 1984

Not Releasable to Contractors/Consultants

This is a Department Of Defense Intelligence Document prepared by the Eastern Division,
Directorate for Research,
Defense Intelligence Agency

Product Manager:

Korea Branch

Military Capabilities Section

25X1

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

Classified By: Multiple Sources Declassify on: OADR

SECRET SPOKE

PREFACE

(S/RELROK) The North Korean People	's Army training exercises have	
demonstrated a distinct change in activity		
	then concludes with an assessment 25X1	
of the current status of North Korean military training exercises.		

(U) The product manager would like to acknowledge the extensive support and inputs by the following analysts:

25X1

- (U) This document contains both Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and collateral information. Individual portions are marked to indicate specifically individual classifications and control markings applicable to their content, including WNINTEL when appropriate for collateral-level portions.
- (U) Each classified title and heading in this report has been properly marked; all those unmarked are unclassified.
- (U) Questions and comments concerning this publication should be referred in writing to the Defense Intelligence Agency (ATTN: DB-2), Washington, D.C. 20301-6111. Requests for additional copies should be forwarded through command approval channels, as appropriate, to DIA (ATTN: RTS-2A), using DD Form 1142, Interagency Document Request, in accordance with DIA Manual 59-3, DIA Reference Library.


iii (Reverse Blank)

CONTENTS

		Page	
SUN	MARY	vii	
1.	BACKGROUND	1	
2.	****	1	25X1
3.	***********	2	
4.	CONCLUSIONS	4	

(Reverse Blank)
SECRET SPOKE

SUMMARY



vii (Reverse Blank) SECRET SPOKE

1. BACKGROUND

(S/RELROK) The regular North Korean military forces are known collectively as the North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The NKPA is the fourth largest Communist armed force and the sixth largest armed force in the world. NKPA's army, navy, and air force components have equal status. Korean Army (NKA), is the largest of the country's three Services and comprises about 90 percent of the 25X1 personnel). Currently, it is composed of at least 12 corps: 8 with geographic responsibilities, 3 with functional responsibilities, and 1 that controls selected special purpose units nationwide. Its mission is to maintain the territorial integrity of the country and assist in internal security, civic action, and agricultural programs. Most important is the NKA's role of providing North Korean military training exercises have 25X1 traditionally focused on developing and maintaining NKA combat readiness. 25X1 scope of training, however, 2. NORTH KOREA TRAINING EXERCISES (1960-79) 25X1 (S/RELROK) regional and progressed in a relatively predictable manner toward 25X1 more complex, larger exercises throughout the training year. Usually from late spring through the summer, the ground forces engaged in small-unit combat training while air regiments emphasized basic flight proficiency. Most naval units were involved with routine sea and coastal patrolling operations as well as low intensity gunnery and air defense tactics. (S/RELROK) From autumn through early winter, training and maneuvers gradually increased in tempo with army units conducting combined-arms exercises at regional training areas. For the most part, unit sizes were limited to On occasion, elements of a battalions of infantry, armor, or artillery. regiment or brigade were observed in the field. Air and naval forces as well as air and army units, were reportedly on maneuvers in contiguous areas and possibly engaged in coordinated exercises. From mid-winter through early spring, all Services of the NKPA were invariably active, curtailing or ceasing training only on national holidays. 25X1 25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1


25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1 25X1





Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18 : CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2

SECRET SPOKE

nationwide exercises. The most likely reason why the North Koreans may have decided against conducting nationwide exercises for these periods is the current reorganization and redeployment of at least part of the NKA. Other possible reasons include:

- -- An attempt by Pyongyang to cool down tensions on the peninsula as a result of adverse international publicity caused by the Rangoon bombing incident.
- -- An attempt to eliminate the shortcomings noted during the three previous nationwide exercises.
- -- An attempt to prevent exacerbating an already difficult national economic situation by calling up reserves from a dwindling manpower pool, directing limited transportion resources to support non-productive military activities, creating additional fuel shortages, and disrupting industrial production schedules.



SECRET SPOKE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/18 : CIA-RDP87T00495R001001010024-2 SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL

SECRET